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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs:
A Chilling Effect?
Ivan Franceschini and Elisa Nesossi*A B S T R A C T
Since their emergence in China in the mid-1990s, labor NGOs have been exposed to a wide
array of threats by the Party-state. But under Xi Jinping the repressive strategies of the Chi-
nese authorities have become more sophisticated, with the adoption of new laws and regu-
lations aimed at enforcing state control and efforts to cut the NGOs’ access to foreign fund-
ing. How doChinese laborNGO activists cope with these threats? Do the attacks silence them
or reinforce their commitment? This article assesses the consequences of repression on two
levels: at a subjective level, affecting the outlook and motivations of individual activists, and
on an operational level, affecting the priorities and strategies of labor NGOs. We argue that
while labor activists are equipped to deal with the “rough” side of repression, the more so-
phisticated approach recently pursued by Chinese authorities is much more threatening.Apparently, the situation has reached a point of no return. It’s the same everywhere in the country, as
long as you work on labor issues.
—Chinese labor NGO activist, August 2016
The employees of Chinese labor NGOs have grown accustomed to dealingwith the suspicions and hostility of the Party-state. Over the years, they have
been repeatedly threatened with ﬁnes, evictions, broken careers, and arrests. Some
have been roughed up and their ofﬁces have been raided. In some cases, their fam-
ily members, no matter how far away, have received ominous visits by ofﬁcials.
Nonetheless, they usually managed to keep their organizations aﬂoat, in the belief
that the storm of the moment would abate and that, eventually, they would retain
some space to operate. After all, as they argued at every opportunity, by providing
legal counseling to the workers they were in effect helping to channel labor dis-*We are thankful for the suggestions of the editors, two anonymous reviewers, Christian Sorace, Nicho-
las Loubere, and participants at a workshop on labor rights sponsored by the Australian Centre on China in
the World.
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80putes through the legal system, thus assisting the Party-state in maintaining social
stability, a fact that, in their view, the authorities were surely bound to understand.
However, in the past few years, new repressive methods employed by the gov-
ernment have shaken this conﬁdence of labor NGO employees. Traditionally, la-
bor NGOs in China have focused on three kinds of activities, which they consid-
ered relatively safe in the Chinese political context: (a) establishing workers’
centers, places that usually include a small library and that offer educational classes
and recreational activities; (b) running outreach programs on labor rights, for in-
stance, by distributing leaﬂets and materials about the Chinese labor law; and
(c) conducting social surveys and policy advocacy.1 A number of NGOs have also
engaged in “rights protection” (weiquan 维权) activities, providing workers with
assistance in utilizing legal channels and, occasionally, acting as their representa-
tive in resolving labor disputes.2 Some others have established collaborations with
multinational corporations to carry out occupational health and safety programs
and social dialogue inside factories. The focus on activities of this kind has gained
Chinese labor NGOs the unﬂattering label of “anti-solidarity machines”—a term
coined by scholars Ching Kwan Lee and Shen Yuan, who have argued that by put-
ting toomuch emphasis on individual workers’ legal rights, these organizations are
actually hindering the development of a proper labor movement in China orga-
nized around workers’ collective rights and interests.3
Only in the past few years have a few labor NGOs started to go beyond this ap-
proach of helping individual workers mount legal cases by promoting collective
bargaining.4 While continuing to provide free legal aid and legal training, these
organizations have intervened actively in strikes launched by workers, encourag-
ing aggrieved employees to elect their own representatives in order to negotiate
collectively with employers. In light of this shift, labor lawyer Duan Yi has argued
that Chinese labor NGOs are transforming themselves from being “service-type”1. Chris King-chi Chan, “Community-Based Organizations for Migrant Workers’ Rights: The Emergence
of Labour NGOs in China,” Community Development Journal 48, no. 1 (2013): 6–22.
2. Yi Xu, “Labor Non-Governmental Organizations in China: Mobilizing Rural Migrant Workers,” Jour-
nal of Industrial Relations 55, no. 2 (2013): 243–59.
3. Ching Kwan Lee and Yuan Shen, “The Anti-Solidarity Machine? Labor Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions in China,” in From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization: Markets, Workers, and the State in a Changing
China, ed. Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee, and Mary Gallagher (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2011), 173–87.
4. Feng Chen and Xuehui Yang, “Movement-Oriented Labour NGOs in South China: Exit with Voice
and Displaced Unionism,” China Information 31, no. 2 (2017): 155–75; Jay Chen, “Zhongguo weiquan
zhengti xia de jiti kangyi: Taizichang dabagong de anlifenxi” [Protest mobilization in an authoritarian re-
gime: The case of a wildcat strike in southern China], Taiwan Shehuixue 30 (2015): 1–53; Chunyun Li and
Mingwei Liu, “A Pathway to a Vital Labour Movement in China? A Case Study of a Union-Led Protest
against Walmart,” in China at Work: A Labour Process Perspective on the Transformation of Work and Em-
ployment in China, ed. Mingwei Liu and Chris Smith (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 281–311.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000( fuwuxing服务型) and “rights protection-type” (weiquanxing维权型) organiza-
tions into “labor movement-type” (gongyunxing工运型) organizations.5 It was in
the middle of this transition from individual legal mobilization to collective labor
struggles that, in December 2015, at the end of a particularly gloomy year for Chi-
nese civil society,6 the authorities in Guangdong stepped in and rounded up two
dozen labor NGO activists, formally charging ﬁve of them with “gathering a
crowd to disrupt public order” and “embezzlement.”At the national level, in April
2016 the Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations’
Activities withinMainland China (hereafter, ForeignNGOs Law) was passed. The
new law is aimed, among other things, at curtailing access to foreign funding by
grassroots NGOs working in sensitive ﬁelds, including labor issues.7 Taken to-
gether, these events have proven that the “red line” of what is not allowable has
shifted once again since 2015, leading Chinese labor NGOs to question and read-
just their strategies. Thus, as we will highlight in the last section of this article,
some have gone back to the relatively safer options of engaging in “legal mobili-
zation” for individual workers, while others have reinvented themselves in the
ﬁeld of corporate social responsibility. Those that continue to carry out collective
bargaining screen their cases increasingly carefully, explicitly warn workers about
the possible risks, and stay clear of disruptive events or train workers far away
from their workplace.
This article focuses speciﬁcally on those labor NGOs that—to resort to Duan
Yi’s categorization—belong to the “rights protection” and “labor movement”
types. While the boundaries between these kinds of organizations are often
blurred, as NGOs simultaneously engage in different kinds of activities, we do
not take into account those organizations that exclusively organize cultural activ-
ities and services for workers. The article analyzes the consequences of state re-
pression not only for Chinese labor NGOs as organizations but also for the NGOs’
employees. In particular, we examine how repression operates both in its everyday
form and during crackdowns and how individual labor NGO activists and their
organizations respond.5. Yi Duan, “Gongyunxing laogong NGO de qianjing yu tiaozhan” [Prospects and challenges for labor
NGOs of the labor movement type], Gongmin, May 20, 2015, accessed December 13, 2017, https://
xgmyd.com/archives/17927.
6. For example, July 2015 witnessed a crackdown against weiquan lawyers that saw the disappearance
and detention of hundreds of lawyers all around China. See Susan Trevaskes and Elisa Nesossi, “The Fog of
Law,” in China Story Yearbook 2015: Pollution, ed. Geremie R. Barmé, Linda Jaivin, and Jeremy Goldkorn
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2016), 64–85.
7. Ivan Franceschini and Elisa Nesossi, “The Foreign NGOs Management Law: A Compendium,” in
Made in China Yearbook 2016: Disturbances in Heaven, ed. Ivan Franceschini, Kevin Lin, and Nicholas
Loubere (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2017), 60–67.
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80Western scholars studying social movements have explored the relationship
between repression and rights activism.8 In this context, studies focusing on non-
democratic countries have demonstrated that in such political systems repression
does not necessarily produce predictable outcomes. Empirical analyses have pro-
duced conﬂicting accounts and there is no consensus on the consequences of re-
pression for dissent. Some studies have explained that repression can generate
fear that quells contention; others, on the contrary, argue that repression triggers
a level of anger and outrage that fuels mobilization.9
This literature can provide a framework for examining Chinese labor NGOs.
Little has been written speciﬁcally on the repression of such NGOs by the Party-
state, and, more broadly, there is scant literature thus far that examines develop-
ments in the aftermath of crackdowns against civil society in Xi Jinping’s China.
In a study based on extensive ethnographic research in 2009–10—well before Xi
came to power—Diana Fu considers how the Party-state exerts everyday control
over labor organizations.10 There she argues that everyday state control under
Hu Jintao’s leadership was fragmented and heterogeneous, with bureaucratic de-
centralization and interagency conﬂicts producing “simultaneous and incongruous
forms of control” that both contained and facilitated grassroots activism.11 In a
more recent article in The China Journal comparing the Hu and Xi eras, Diana Fu
and Greg Distelhorst explain how repression has shifted from being reactive to
mass incidents to instead taking proactive actions to contain contention before it8. Sabine Carey, “The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression,” Political Research Quarterly
59, no. 1 (2006): 1–11; Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Jennifer Earl and Sarah Soule, “The Impact of Repression: The Effect of
Police Presence and Action on Subsequent Protest Rates,” Research on Social Movements, Conﬂict and Change
30 (2010): 75–113; Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978).
9. Terry Boswell and William J. Dixon, “Marx’s Theory of Rebellion: A Cross-National Analysis of Class
Exploitation, Economic Development, and Violent Revolt,” American Sociological Review 58, no. 5 (1993):
681–702; Charles Brockett, “A Protest-Cycle Resolution of the Repression/Popular Protest Paradox,” Social
Sciences History 17, no. 3 (1993): 457–84; James de Nardo, Power in Numbers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1985); Marwan Khawaja, “Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the
West Bank,” Sociological Forum 8, no. 1 (1993): 47–71; Marwan Khawaja, “Resource Mobilization, Hard-
ship, and Popular Collective Action in the West Bank,” Social Forces 73, no. 1 (1994): 191–220; Mark
Lichbach, “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent,” Journal of
Conﬂict Resolution 31, no. 2 (1987): 266–97; Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1995); Edward Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Vio-
lence,” American Sociological Review 50, no. 1 (1985): 47–61; Johan Olivier, “State Repression and Collective
Action in South Africa, 1970 to 1984,” South African Journal of Sociology 22, no. 4 (1991): 109–17; Mancur
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Neil Smelser,
Theory of Collective Behavior (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962); Kurt Schock, Civil Resistance Today
(Cambridge: Polity, 2015); David Snyder and Charles Tilly, “Hardship and Collective Violence in France,
1830–1960,” American Sociological Review 37, no. 5 (1972): 520–32.
10. Diana Fu, “Fragmented Control: Governing Contentious Labor Organizations in China,” Governance:
An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 30, no. 3 (2017): 445–62.
11. Ibid., 447.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000occurs.12 We agree with Fu and Distelhorst when they argue that repression does
not generate predictable outcomes and that in the Chinese political context it does
not necessarily produce intended results. Indeed, according to our experience,
while repression can potentially lead to theweakening or disappearance of activism,
it can also further motivate activists to pursue tactical innovations in order to keep
up their work.
More speciﬁcally, our ﬁndings show that repression in the form of “rough”
threats of violence, eviction, and criminal punishment has only a partial “chilling
effect” on the determination of individual labor activists and on the operations
of labor NGOs. In contrast, more “sophisticated” strategies of repression and con-
trol—for instance, the adoption of new laws and regulations that increase bureau-
cratic control over NGOs and severely limit their access to funding—have far more
serious consequences at both an individual and an organizational level. As we
mention later in the article, just until few years ago, repression was able to spur
activism. For instance, according to the estimates provided by our interviewees,
after the wave of repression of 2012, labor NGOs in Guangdong increased in
number, and some of them, rather than falling silent, started to engage with col-
lective bargaining. Today the situation has changed dramatically. Our study
highlights that the very survival of labor NGOs in China is in peril exactly be-
cause the Party-state’s strategies of repression have evolved and shifted in form
from an approach basedmostly on violence and threats to a more nuanced strat-
egy that integrates violence and threats with more sophisticated tools like legal
intimidations and funding curtailment. In Xi Jinping’s China, labor organiza-
tions are seriously struggling to carry out their work without reliable sources
of income. They are also making a series of strategic adjustments to their ap-
proach, changes that not only water down the role that these organizations play
among the workers but also reveal the fragile nature of this community of activ-
ists.
In addition to this introduction and a conclusion, the article is organized in four
sections. In the ﬁrst section, we describe the everydaymethods the authorities adopt
to keep labor NGOs in check, paying particular attention to the peculiar multi-
faceted relationship that binds labor NGO activists to their ofﬁcial controllers
within the state security apparatus. In the second, we present the facts related
to the latest crackdown and explain how these events present a signiﬁcant break
with previous state-sponsored attacks against labor NGOs. In the third, we ana-
lyze how state repression inﬂuences labor activists’ subjective outlook on their work
and their future. In the fourthwe consider the impact of the latest crackdown on the
strategies and priorities of labor NGOs.12. Diana Fu and Greg Distelhorst, “Grassroots Participation and Repression under Hu Jintao and Xi
Jinping,” China Journal, no. 79 (January 2018): 100–122.
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80The article is based on ﬁeldwork in China that one of the authors conducted
from January 2009 to August 2016. Over this period, he observed the implemen-
tation of eight international cooperation projects aimed at promoting the rights
of Chinese migrant workers as a consultant to the project manager. These initia-
tives relied on collaboration between an international labor NGO and nine differ-
ent Chinese labor NGOs (three of which were branches of the same organization).
Besides taking part in the project activities and monitoring the ﬁnancial situation
of the various projects, the author as an independent researcher conducted several
dozen semi-structured interviews with leaders and employees of labor NGOs. In a
ﬁrst round between 2009 and 2011, 30 leaders and employees of 16 different labor
NGOs, mostly based in Shenzhen, were interviewed. During the second round in
2014–15, interviews were conducted with 32 activists in 19 labor NGOs in Guang-
dong province in the cities of Shenzhen, Dongguan, Guangzhou, and Huizhou, as
well as some areas in Hunan, Zhejiang, and Shandong provinces. The ﬁnal round
was inAugust 2016, when, due to the difﬁcult political situation, he was able to con-
duct interviews with only 11 activists from 10 labor NGOs in Shenzhen, Guang-
zhou, Dongguan, and Nanjing. In total, over the years he interviewed 62 people
from 29 different NGOs, a dozen of whom were key informants who were inter-
viewed more than once.THE ROUTINE OF STATE CONTROL
Borrowing from Fu, “fragmented control” means that in their everyday opera-
tions labor NGOs have to deal simultaneously with several state bodies.13 In those
relatively rare instances in which they are properly registered as nonproﬁt entities,
they fall under the supervision of the Department of Civil Affairs (minzheng
bumen民政部门);14 while carrying out activities among workers on strike they of-
ten ﬁnd themselves face-to-face with the police; and in addressing workers’ ordi-
nary grievances they communicate with the state’s labor ofﬁces (laodong bumen
劳动部门).15 Still, given the reliance of many labor NGOs on foreign funding and
the political sensitivity of labor issues, the agency they have the most fraught deal-
ings with is the secretive “state security” (guobao国保), a branch of the govern-
ment’s security apparatus charged with protecting the country from domestic po-
litical threats. Similar to other types of activists in China, they receive summonses13. Diana Fu, “Fragmented Control: Governing Contentious Labor Organizations in China,” Governance:
An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions 30, no. 3 (2017): 445–62.
14. In some local jurisdictions, labor NGOs are allowed to register with the local departments of civil af-
fairs as “social enterprises.” Still, many labor activists believe there are advantages in having a commercial
registration (administered by the department of industry and commerce) or not having any registration at
all.
15. Sean Cooney, Sarah Bidduph, and Ying Zhu, Law and Fair Work in China (New York: Routledge,
2013), 126.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000to “have a cup of tea” (he cha 喝茶) with state security ofﬁcials—a form of “soft
repression” as Fu deﬁnes it.16 The frequency of these gatherings—which some-
times take place in informal settings such as a McDonald’s—depends on the
political circumstances: it usually intensiﬁes on the occasion of politically sensi-
tive events but then declines in quiet times, down to one meeting every several
months.
Although state security ofﬁcials can “joke with you one moment, and then get
violent the next,” as anNGO employee observed in 2016, these encounters usually
take place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. The meetings serve a two-
fold purpose. On the one hand, ofﬁcials seek information about the activities of
labor NGOs, in particular regarding recent contacts with foreigners and any
new source of funding. On the other, they use themeetings to subtly warn, inform,
or remind activists about boundaries that theymust not cross if they want to avoid
severe repercussions. From this point of view, the gatherings can be considered
mutually beneﬁcial: the Party-state gets to remind labor activists that they are un-
der surveillance, while activists beneﬁt by ﬁnding out what is already ofﬁcially
known about them and what the current priorities of the authorities are, and
through this they are able to avoid unnecessary risks. The symbiotic nature of
such a relationship emerges clearly from this testimony of a labor NGO activist
in 2016:
When we talked, the people from state security even said that they support our ac-
tivities to protect the rights of fellow workers. The main problem is that the upper
levels put pressure on them, so they have asked us to ring them up anytime we do
something. That way they can be ready in their minds. This is because if something
happened and the upper levels heard about it without any prior knowledge, they
would get a lot of heat, which in turn would lead them to put pressure on us. For
this reason, since 2016 we have slightly changed our strategy. Now when fellow
workers seek our help, after understanding the situationwe report to them—it doesn’t
matter if it is the state security or the social stabilitymaintenance system.We tell them
that in such and such a place there are some workers who have already presented
some demands to factory management and that they came to seek our help. If we de-
cide to get involved, we inform them ﬁrst.
Various NGO activists conﬁrmed that this kind of relationship can also offer
some perks. One of them told us in 2016 that “sometimes [state security ofﬁcials]
also offer us some gifts, for instance, shopping coupons, which obviously we don’t
accept. . . . But it seems that in recent years they’ve become poorer, they don’t have
as much money as before.” In another instance, an activist told us that in 2012,
while he was recovering in the hospital from surgery, the state security ofﬁcial16. Fu, “Fragmented Control,” 450.
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80in charge of him had paid him a visit. Wishing him a speedy recovery, the guobao
agent had brought him ﬂowers and had engaged him in conversation. The activist
explained that, since this ofﬁcial had been supervising him for quite some time,
they had almost become friends, regularly exchanging greetings and wishes dur-
ing all major festivities. One of the authors had direct experience of this ambigu-
ous relationship between labor activists and state security on several occasions.
For instance, in 2009 or 2010 he was managing a project in partnership with a la-
bor NGO that was engaging in fake activities and handing in inﬂated invoices.
When the author refused to reimburse some obviously dodgy expenditure, the
leader of the labor NGO hinted that he would say something unpleasant about
the author in his next meeting with state security.
In authoritarian China, the distinction between politically sensitive or even
hostile activities and acceptable activities has always been ﬂuid.17 This means that
activists have to rely on disparate sources of information to understand where to
draw the “line of acceptability.”18 Our interviewees related that the peculiar rela-
tionship established with state security allows labor NGO activists to better un-
derstand the “bottom line” (dixian 底线) that they are not supposed to cross. It
is exactly such an understanding that permits labor NGOs to play a role in strikes
and protests in relative safety, as long as they respect certain preconditions, such
as making sure that the workers do not leave the factory premises, do not organize
across workplaces, and do not leak news of their protests through social media.
Unfortunately, the guarantees offered by the state security sometimes prove illu-
sory. For instance, after being repeatedly evicted from his ofﬁce, a labor activist
was told by state security ofﬁcials that the harassment would cease if he stopped
accepting foreign funding. To test this, he decided to stop a project on collective
bargaining funded by a foreign NGO. After a few months, realizing that this de-
cision did not make any difference, he decided to resume cooperating with inter-
national donors.19
When a crackdown is looming, invitations from state security ofﬁcials cease,
and instead of dealing with the “reasonable” face of the Party-state, activists are
left facing much less sympathetic agencies—from the “ordinary” police to the of-
ﬁces in charge of taxation and safety in the workplace. The peculiar and at times
very personal and ambiguously friendly relationship established between activists
and state security ofﬁcials leads some activists to shift the blame for repression
onto other Party-state institutions that carried out the crackdowns. This attitude
may explain why, in spite of the attacks that some labor activists were subjected to
in late 2015, some of the labor NGO leaders whomwe interviewed half a year later
paradoxically explained that their relationship with the state security ofﬁcers was17. Sebastian Heilmann, ed., China’s Political System (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littleﬁeld, 2016), 273.
18. Fu, “Fragmented Control,” 453.
19. Franceschini’s interview with labor activist, 2016.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000improving, as the guobao apparently had become “more understanding and ap-
proving of our activities.”20 The fragmentation of the Chinese control apparatus
appears to be instrumental, as it not only allows the Party-state to maintain its
control over labor NGOs in ordinary times but also assists the authorities inmain-
taining a semblance of normalcy even during the worst crackdowns.A CONTINUOUS CRACKDOWN
Since the 1990s, crackdowns have been a periodic feature in the bumpy relation-
ship between the Party-state and labor NGOs. Still, until 2012, repression oc-
curred in cycles, typically coinciding with major events such as National Day on
October 1 or a Party congress or in the wake of particular serious strikes or “mass
incidents.” The year 2012 was a turning point for the Chinese leadership, with then
President Hu Jintao retiring and Xi Jinping rising to power, a transfer that also
marked a shift in governance platforms and approaches to civil society activism.
Under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2002–12), the Chinese state’s
repressive apparatus was complicated;21 nevertheless, civil society was allowed
some space to operate in order to offer services that the state was not able to pro-
vide, all the while being kept under scrutiny because of the alleged threat to social
stability (shehui wending社会稳定).22 Civil society organizations could operate in
the interstices created by a “fragmented authoritarian state” and were kept in check
through forms of “ control.”23 Since 2013, Xi Jinping has made “governing the na-
tion according to the law” (yifa zhiguo依法治国) a key governance platform, em-
phasizing the role of the legal system as a tool of social and political control. What
we observed in our research is that in Xi’s China, the authorities are using the law
to exercise everyday control, closing those “policy windows” opened up by the
“control” of Hu Jintao’s leadership.24 Attacks against civil society, including labor
NGOs, have become more consistent and it has become increasingly difﬁcult to
distinguish between periods of “crackdown” and more ordinary times when labor
NGOs can conduct their activities without harassment.20. The activists who felt this way put the ultimate blame for their woes on the labor bureau bureaucracy
and on the ofﬁcial All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)—the only union whose existence is al-
lowed in China, a Leninist mass organization under the thumb of the CCP.
21. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government
Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (2013): 1–18.
22. Andrew Mertha, China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2008); Anthony J. Spires, “Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian
State,” Journal of Sociology 117, no. 1 (2011): 1–45; Jessica Teets, Civil Society under Authoritarianism: The
China Model (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
23. Kenneth G. Lieberthal, “Introduction: The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model and Its Limitations,”
in Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision-Making in Post-Mao China, ed. Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David
Lamton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 1–30; Fu, “Fragmented Control.”
24. Timothy Hildebrandt, Social Organizations and the Authoritarian State in China (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013).
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80The crackdown that took place in 2012 initially seemed just another “ordinary”
attack against labor NGOs. In August that year, several labor NGOs in Guang-
dong, especially in Shenzhen, were repeatedly and coercively evicted from their
premises and forced to momentarily shut down their activities.25 Yet, while public
attention to the evictions waned very quickly, this was not merely a temporary
attack. For instance, one labor activist whom we interviewed in September
2015 complained that since 2013 he had been forced to move his ofﬁce no less
than 15 times, once every two to three months. At the time of the interview, he
had spent about four months in his latest ofﬁce, his longest stay in the previous
two years. In another case frommid-2012, after hired thugs had attacked its ofﬁce,
a prominent Shenzhen labor NGO was forced to vacate its premises. In late 2014,
when we met its representatives, their ofﬁce was based in a hotel room and they
had completely given up on the idea of opening the premises to the public. A labor
NGO activist told us in November 2014: “In the past, they didn’t provoke us, nor
did we provoke them. Basically, the situation back then could not even be called
repression. Usually, they just knew about the existence of our organization and
there were people from the government who often came to talk with us. . . . But
these last few years have been quite different. They’ve started to harass us directly.”
The 2012 crackdown appeared to be intimately connected with a strategy Jude
Howell has referred to as the “welfarist incorporation” of labor NGOs, which was
being pursued by the Party-state under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao. Incorporation entailed a “political and economic arrangement between
the state and organized society, whereby selected civic organizations are invited
by the state to assist in the implementation of policy.”26 At about the same time
as the evictions started, the trade union federation of Guangdong province set up
the “Federation of Social Service Organizations for GuangdongWorkers,” an um-
brella organization that included some well-known grassroots labor NGOs in ad-
dition to several industrial employer associations, university legal clinics, founda-
tions, local trade union agencies, lawyers, and union cadres.27 Although this
umbrella organization seems to have fallen into oblivion, several labor NGO ac-
tivists whom we interviewed observed that the Party-state today continues to
claim the space once occupied solely by labor NGOs, for instance, by promoting
support to victims of labor-related injuries, a realm that before was occupied al-
most exclusively by labor NGOs.25. Xiaotian Du and Renwang Zhang, “Laogong NGO: Chengzhang de fannao” [Labor NGOs: The wor-
ries of growing], Nanfang Ribao [Southern Daily], September 3, 2012.
26. Jude Howell, “Shall We Dance? Welfarist Incorporation and the Politics of State-Labor NGO Rela-
tion,” China Quarterly, no. 223 (2015): 702–23.
27. Qingyu Xie, “Sheng zonggonghui qiantou goujian shouge zhigong fuwulei shuniuxing shehui zuzhi”
[The provincial union federation takes the lead in establishing the ﬁrst service social organization of a trans-
mission belt kind for workers], Nanfang Ribao, May 17, 2012.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000While the 2012 crackdownwas still “traditional” in the “rough”methods adopted
by the authorities—forced evictions, violence, intimidation of family members,
and so on—the years that followed Xi’s ascent to power saw an escalation in the
tension between the Party-state and NGOs and a shift to more “sophisticated”
methods of repression and control. The authorities have adopted a whole new
set of laws and regulations aimed at reinforcing the control of the Party-state over
civil society and severing the international ties of these NGOs, including the con-
troversial Law on Foreign NGOs. These laws will make cooperation between for-
eign donors and Chinese grassroots NGOs working on politically sensitive issues
extremely difﬁcult. At the same time, the Party-state has criminally charged and
convicted a number of individual activists, including those working on labor
rights. As mentioned, in December 2015 the police rounded up a couple of dozen
labor activists in Guangdong and brought charges against ﬁve of them.28 On that
occasion, the state media systematically attacked Zeng Feiyang, the leader of the
Panyu Migrant Workers Centre, a pioneering labor NGO established in Guang-
zhou in the late 1990s. In a long article published online on December 22, the of-
ﬁcial Xinhua News Agency accused Zeng of, among other things, embezzling
funds illegally obtained from foreign donors and promoting himself as a “star of
the labor movement” (gongyun zhi xing工运之星) while acting in total disregard
of the actual interests of the workers.29 To further damage his credibility, Zeng was
also accused of several instances of sexual misconduct. In the following days, a re-
port of a similar tone appeared in the People’s Daily, which also mentioned the re-
lationship between Zeng Feiyang and China Labor Bulletin, a well-known NGO
based in Hong Kong led by Han Dongfang, a former worker who had played a
high-proﬁle role in the Tiananmen protestmovement of 1989 and has been in exile
since the mid-1990s.30 Eventually, in September 2016 Zeng Feiyang pleaded guilty
and the Panyu District No. 2 People’s Court sentenced him to three years’ impris-
onment, suspended for four years, for “gathering a crowd to disturb social order,”
while two of his colleagues received prison sentences of 18 months, suspended for
two years, on the same charge. Another colleague refused to cooperate with the
authorities but after repeated harassment of his parents he ﬁnally capitulated and
pleaded guilty. In November 2016, the Panyu Court sentenced him to 21 months
in jail.28. Sui Lee Wee, “China Arrests Four Labor Activists Amid Crackdown: Lawyers,” Reuters,
January 10, 2016, accessed December 13, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-rights
-idUSKCN0UO05M20160110.
29. Wei Zou, “Guangdong jingfang dadiao weiquan zuzhi ju 7 ren, zhufan bei cheng ‘gongyun zhi xing’ ”
[Guangdong police takes down a weiquan organization and detains seven people: Main culprit was “star of
the labor movement”], Xinhua, December 22, 2015, accessed December 13, 2017, http://m.thepaper.cn
/newsDetail_forward_1412138.
30. Cong Zhang, “Qidi ‘gongyun zhi xing’ zhen mianmu” [Exposing the true face of the “star of the la-
bor movement”], Renmin Ribao, December 23, 2015, 11.
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80This harsh treatment of Zeng and his colleagues shows clear similarities with
the treatment meted out to prominent weiquan lawyers and other well-known
Chinese activists targeted in a crackdown that took place a few months earlier
in July 2015. They were singled out, held incommunicado, and formally arrested
only after a long period of time; they were unable to meet with their choice of law-
yers; their alleged crimes and collusion with “hostile foreign forces” ( jingwai didui
shili 境外敌对势力) were disclosed to the public via the ofﬁcial media, and their
staged confessions of guilt were displayed on television.31 Zeng and his colleagues’
treatment was probably related to their outspokenness in several high-proﬁle cases
of labor unrest. The December Xinhua article described in considerable detail the
role that Zeng’s organization had played earlier that year in a high-proﬁle col-
lective action undertaken by workers of a footwear company in Guangzhou that
was planning to relocate its factory without providing proper compensation to
its employees.
The 2015 crackdown included some fundamental differences with previous
waves of repression. First, earlier instances of repression against labor NGOs were
local matters, whereas the attack against Zeng and other activists was publicized
nationwide and was part of a concerted nationwide campaign against Chinese
civil society at large. This was made abundantly clear when several national TV
stations concurrently aired long accusatory segments of a very similar tone.32 Sec-
ond, while earlier attacks primarily used extralegal means such as intimidation,
raids by hired thugs,33 and strong informal pressure on landlords to evict the
NGOs, this latest crackdown mainly employed legal means. This ongoing wave
of repression has made use not only of the criminal legislation but also of a set
of new laws and regulations—including the Foreign NGOs Law, the Charity
Law, and the Opinion on Domestic Civil Society Organizations—that address
all facets of civil society and signiﬁcantly reinforce the demarcation between or-
ganizations belonging to China’s “ofﬁcial” and “unofﬁcial” civil society, strength-
ening the ﬁrst and weakening the latter.34 These developments suggest amore sys-
tematic approach by the Party-state aimed at remolding the relationship between
state and society in China and severing the international ties of Chinese NGOs
that work on politically sensitive matters, including labor issues.31. Christian Sorace, “Extracting Affect: Televised Cadre Confessions in Contemporary China,” Public
Culture, forthcoming.
32. For instance, see the segments on http://news.cntv.cn/2015/12/23/VIDE1450829040823784.shtml and
http://news.cntv.cn/2015/12/23/VIDE1450847339236690.shtml.
33. Lynette Ong, “Thugs and Outsourcing of State Repression in China,” China Journal, no. 80 (July
2018), in this issue.
34. Mary Gallagher, “China: The Limits of Civil Society in a Late Leninist State,” in Civil Society and Po-
litical Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Change, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 419–54.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000COPING WITH REPRESSION
How do labor activists react to state repression at a personal, subjective level? In
spite of all the pressures they are under, in our interviews throughout the years,
labor NGO activists seldom expressed fears about the rough threats of violence
and intimidation coming from the Party-state, not even in the wake of the worst
crackdowns. Like other rights activists in China, they feel accustomed to state re-
pression, to the point of considering it the normal state of affairs for their profes-
sion. While they are deeply aware that changes in the political structures affect
their ability to work and the form that their activism can take, they remain unde-
terred in their motivations. It was often repeated to us in interviews that when
they decided to work for a labor NGO they knew perfectly well what they had
signed up to. As one labor activist told us in the summer of 2016: “What is there
to be afraid of? . . . I just think that I have a duty to do these things: if one day they
arrest me, the people around me will know what kind of person I am.” Neverthe-
less, the move against Zeng Feiyang and his colleagues rattled nerves and for a few
months the whole sector became quiet and especially cautious. One of the most
outspoken NGO leaders admitted that in the months that followed the arrests
he was “terriﬁed”:
Of course I’m scared. Who’s not scared of losing his freedom? It’s just that person-
ally I think that what I do is legal. It doesn’t violate any law of the state. . . . What we
do is reasonable, so why don’t we dare to speak out? . . . I feel terriﬁed in every
single thing I do. In April and May we dealt with seven collective disputes. Actu-
ally, I felt so scared, but there was nothing I could do: once you have started you
have to keep going. It is like when you enter a battleﬁeld: you should not be afraid,
because if you’re afraid you should not be there in the ﬁrst place. It’s that simple.
This sacriﬁce of mine is glorious. If you stand on a battleﬁeld and sacriﬁce yourself,
this is deﬁnitely glorious. . . . I don’t care about the pressure, because I’ve been do-
ing this for ten years and I’ve been fully mentally prepared since the beginning.
Behind this quixotic willingness to keep struggling and these martial undertones—
similarly exhibited by other weiquan activists35—there are pragmatic calculations
about the acceptable “costs” of activism. According to this labor NGO activist, a
punishment of up to three years in jail—which was exactly the length of Zeng’s
suspended sentence, announced several months later—was a price worth paying,
especially considering that being imprisoned would increase the respect his peers
felt for him. In his words, “If you really commit a crime, other people will look
down on you, right? But if you do some righteous things, everybodywill think that35. Eva Pils, China’s Human Rights Lawyers: Advocacy and Resistance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80you are worth respect. What I mean is that it doesn’t matter if you are working
outside or you are in jail, it is still work and it can have a positive signiﬁcance.”
In our interviews, we found that inmany cases, far from having a chilling effect,
“rough” repression reinforces the determination of labor NGO activists and stim-
ulates strategic innovations that enable them to persist. As far back as the after-
math of the 2012 crackdown, Jude Howell observed that “some labor NGOs
are reviewing their approach and turning towards a more movement practice that
focuses on supporting local workers’ groups.”36 This has translated into the new
strategic focus on collective bargaining and collective labor struggles that we high-
lighted at the beginning of this article.
At an individual level, several of our interviewees explained how falling victim
to state repression actually ended up reinforcing their motivation. For instance, in
2013 a worker who was volunteering for a labor NGO in Shenzhen was detained
for joining a strike against the relocation of the company he worked for. Accused
of “gathering a crowd and disrupting the order of public transportation,” he spent
over a year in a cell in the company of common criminals before being released for
lack of evidence. In that case, the attempt to intimidate him did not work, as once
released he decided to establish a labor NGO of his own. He noted in 2015: “Be-
fore being arrested, I was only a volunteer in an NGO. I had never thought about
establishing my own organization, I was just motivated by the idea of serving the
workers. After regaining my freedom, I had an inspiration and I thought that I
might as well establish an organization myself to help even more workers.”
Similarly, a young social worker who had been working for three years for a
labor NGO explained in 2015:
Actually, in 2012 I was considering leaving [this NGO]. I had worked here for a few
years and it was always the same stuff. Then in 2012 they evicted us, and so I felt I
couldn’t leave. When other NGOs were evicted from their premises, many employ-
ees left, but all of us decided to stay and the bond between us became even stronger.
Soon after that, we changed the scope of our work, so now we are carrying out ac-
tivities that we never did before. After 2012, I have never again thought about leaving.
Some NGO employees of worker background feel that they have no alternatives
but to persist in the movement. Having been involved for years in well-funded
projects and having become accustomed to being in the limelight as “saviors”
of the Chinese working class, they are reluctant to return to an anonymous job
in a factory—assuming that they could still get an ordinary job given their repu-
tation as troublemakers. One such activist, who had set up his own organization
using the compensation that he had received for a serious labor-related injury,36. Howell, “Shall We Dance?,” 719.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000told us in 2016: “I have to keep doing this. Honestly, I can’t do anything else. . . . I
haven’t thought about giving up. . . . Before, I was a worker, and if I go back to work
in a factory it will be like before.”
Some other activists feel that their work with labor NGOs has stained their rep-
utation. One told us in 2016:
I don’t worry much, but my relatives do. First, after doing this job for so many years
I don’t have a way out, as everybody knows what I’ve been doing. . . . Even my for-
mer teacher doesn’t have a clear idea of what are the root causes of our work. He just
sees the negative reports in the media and believes that what we do goes against the
Party and the government. Even after our explanations, he basically still believes
that, and there’s no way to convince him. He thinks that the Communist Party is
very good and he says we should be grateful, that if there were no Communist Party
there wouldn’t be the new China and without the new China there wouldn’t be this
good life.
The worries about not being able to go back to a normal life and the resentment
caused by their perception that they are victims of injustices at the hands of the
Party-state all contribute to make labor NGO activists more determined to keep
up with their work in spite of all the challenges. From this point of view, state re-
pression—at least when the political costs of NGO activism are relatively con-
tained—does not have a chilling effect on labor activists and at times even has
a positive, inspiring effect, thus supporting some of the empirical ﬁndings related
to other nondemocratic contexts that we referred to earlier in the text.
Still, in Xi’s China the authorities also rely on laws and regulations that are
making it difﬁcult for labor NGOs to access those foreign funding crucial to their
institutional survival. Although an attitude of “wait and see”was prevalent among
labor activists in 2015 and 2016—after all, nobody could predict how strict the
authorities would be in enforcing the new legislation—all our interviewees ex-
pressed serious worries about funding. This anxiety has always been there, as
many labor NGOs rely on internationally funded projects to carry out their activ-
ities and, in some cases, to survive; but prior to the enactment of the Foreign
NGOs Law these concerns were tempered by the knowledge that there were plenty
of foreign donors willing to provide support. Today, the number of foreign donors
willing (or able) to fund Chinese grassroots NGOs is dropping, and even many of
the donors that are willing to continue do not know how to safely and legally trans-
fer their money to potential beneﬁciaries in China.3737. According to a recent survey, the number of foreign donors dropped nearly 40 percent from 2013 to
2015 (see Su Wang, “2015 NGO jingwai zizhufang shuliang huapo, liang nian ju jiang si xheng” [The num-
ber of foreign donors for Chinese NGOs in two years dropped by nearly 40 percent], Caixin, November 12,
2015). Our regular communications with foreign donors reveal that the Foreign NGOs Law has clearly had a
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80Some are able to quietly transfer relatively small amounts of funding from
abroad in cash or using other ploys, but larger amounts have become almost im-
possible. One of the authors had direct experience of this when, in 2015—well
before the new legislation on foreign NGOs was passed—one of the EU-funded
projects that he was coordinating had to be suspended because the bank where
the local partner NGO held an account refused to change the funding in foreign
currency into RMB. Despite the assistance provided by European ofﬁcials, the
local NGO had no choice but to give up the project and return all the funding,
and as a consequence it faced a ﬁnancial crisis that threatened its existence. In
2016, for the ﬁrst time in many years, at the end of an interview one of the au-
thors was asked by a Chinese labor NGO activist to wire some money—“really,
any amount matters”—to the bank account of one of his friends. Having been
barred from accessing money from abroad directly, he had not received any
funding for more than four months.
Our interviews revealed that a lack of funding has a chilling effect far more
serious than the risk of being arrested and jailed. As one activist reported in
2016: “The biggest trouble that we are currently facing is funding. If we had
enough funding, we could still keep going. The pressures related to our work
are nothing new, they were always there.” Another activist noted in 2015: “Fund-
ing is the biggest problem. We can deal with pressure from the government
through personal connections or by [shifting] our standpoint, but if you don’t
have funding there is nothing you can do.”OPERATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS
How did the shift in the techniques of state repression and control affect the op-
erations of the Chinese labor NGOs under Xi Jinping? Our interviews reveal
three main trends: atomization, strategic changes, and weakened solidarity.
The ﬁrst development—atomization—is in no way an unavoidable consequence
of state repression. In 2014 and 2015, most interviewees stated that the number
of labor NGOs in China had grown since 2012—a particularly ominous year of
political repression—but their organizations had become smaller in size in order
to escape ofﬁcial scrutiny and pressure. Signiﬁcantly, the new organizations were
mostly founded by activists of NGOs that had fallen victim to state repression.
Even after beginning to work independently, these activists had remained on
friendly terms with each other, a development that in the long runmay have ended
up fostering solidarity and trust among organizations, laying the foundations for a“chilling effect” on them. Before the legislation came into force, representatives of foreign organizations dis-
played a “wait and see” attitude, amid the uncertainties concerning their status within the country. Some
were considering diverting their donations to less politically challenging environments where projects could
be carried out with fewer risks.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000tighter network.38 But a couple of years later, the NGOs were struggling to barely
survive due to the lack of funding, and even small organizations were on the verge
of disappearing. In 2016, several activists who hadworked in laborNGOs formore
than a decade felt compelled to leave, arguing that their organizations had become
basically useless. A number of them continue to provide services on an individual
basis as “barefoot lawyers” or “civic agents” (gongmin daili公民代理),39 and others
work individually in worker communities. One interviewee conﬁded in 2016: “We’ve
entered a grey area: we’re not organizations anymore, andmaybe in the futurewe’ll
be reduced to only a few individuals”.
Labor NGO activism has always been a risky matter, and this has led to some
readjustments in the work of labor NGOs. Today, only a few labor NGOs still
assist workers who are on strike to organize to demand collective bargaining.
A great majority of the labor NGOs prefer to limit themselves to the relatively
safer option of “legal mobilization” or to carry out simple cultural activities, or
they have even reinvented themselves as entrepreneurs in the ﬁeld of corporate
social responsibility. Those that still promote collective bargaining carry out their
activities with a heightened feeling of danger and only after having undertaken
some strategic readjustments. First, they screen their cases more carefully. As
one activist told us in 2016, the NGO he was working for used to accept almost
every case that had been reported to them, but now “when we encounter a situ-
ation, we have to understand where the risks lie and what are the dangers if our
organization gets involved.” Second, they feel obliged to warn workers about the
risks they face if they decide to follow their advice: “We need to be more careful.
When we carry out some training for workers, we have to inform them that
weiquan [rights protection] is dangerous.” Finally, instead of rushing to the scene
whenever a strike or a collective protest erupts to advise workers on how to pro-
ceed, they now tend to steer clear of disruptive events and focus on training
workers in locations far from their workplace.
A third trend is that solidarity among labor NGOs is weakening. While intu-
itively we would have expected labor NGOs to coalesce in the face of a common
challenge, the dearth of funding seems to be pitching labor NGOs against each
other. One NGO activist told us in 2016:
Right after the detention of Zeng Feiyang and the other labor NGO activists, the
contacts among NGOs increased, and everybody used to discuss this all the time,
but when the feeling of danger attenuated everything went back to the way it was38. Ivan Franceschini, “Revisiting Chinese Labour NGOs: Some Grounds for Hope?,” in Franceschini
et al., Made in China Yearbook 2016, 46–49.
39. Aaron Halegua, “Who Will Represent China’s Workers? Lawyers, Legal Aid, and the Enforcement of
Labor Rights,” U.S.–Asia Law Institute, New York University School of Law, 2016, accessed December 13,
2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_idp2845977.
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000 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 80before. This is because we don’t have a common way of thinking [zhuti sixiang主
题思想]. Moreover, NGOs now are quite scattered, they all are single organizations
following different directives favored by their donors. Maybe it’s for this reason
that there are some suspicions between organizations and that there are conﬂicts
of interest or contradictions. It’s unavoidable.
Another labor NGO activist said that he hoped the new legislation on NGOs
would have one positive repercussion—exposing those labor NGOs that “existed
only for the sake of scraping by,” as opposed to those that shared his beliefs and
values. This lack of solidarity was nowhere more evident than in an incident that
took place in mid-2016. When, in May, Walmart announced its intention to im-
plement a new ﬂexible scheduling system across its retail stores in China and
asked each of its employees to sign a declaration agreeing to the new system,40
there was signiﬁcant opposition by an informal group of Walmart employees,
the Walmart Chinese Workers Association (WCWA, 沃尔玛中国员工联谊会),
an online network founded by several current and former Walmart employees.41
The online discussions led to a wave of strikes and other forms of protest in
Walmart stores all over the country. In the midst of these, a couple of labor
NGOs based in Guangdong province entered the fray, trying to secure a leading
role in the protest and criticizing the WCWA founders for being too timid in
their dealings with the company. One labor NGO leader—whom some of our in-
terviewees believed to be motivated by the demands of a foreign donor—went so
far as to encourageWalmart workers to set up a new group that would attempt to
force the company to the bargaining table. This led to a series of public exchanges
of spiteful mutual accusations on blogs and NGO chat groups between the found-
ers of WCWA and the intervening labor NGOs. In turn, this caused a split among
the Walmart workers, with some taking one side and some the other, a develop-
ment that several activists deemed even more damaging than state repression.CONCLUSION: A POINT OF NO RETURN?
After two decades of operation, are Chinese labor NGOs approaching a point of
no return? To what extent are the ebbs and ﬂows of repression shaping labor ac-
tivism in China? Sophisticated legal and ﬁnancial means of repression have cre-
ated a situation in which the possibility of continued NGO mobilization has
weakened. While labor NGO activists in China are familiar with and not easily40. In contrast to the current standard eight-hour working day for full-time workers, with the new sys-
tem Walmart would have been able to schedule any number of hours, as long as they added up to 174 hours
per month. The new system would have reduced workers’ overtime pay and introduced an erratic work
schedule.
41. Anita Chan, “The Resistance of Walmart Workers in China: A Missed Opportunity,” in Franceschini
et al., Made in China Yearbook 2016, 50–55, available as open access on the web.
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State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs • 000intimidated by violence, threats, and other rough forms of state repression, they
are more vulnerable when it comes to more sophisticated and legalized forms of
control, such as regulations targeting their sources of income.
Until recently, Chinese labor NGOs were able to steer through cyclical crack-
downs by exploiting the partial protection offered by their ambiguous relation-
ship with state security personnel in the interstices of authoritarian control. Thus,
repression did not mute them but rather, similar to other communities of activists
within China, encouraged organizational shifts and individual self-reﬂection, with
some NGOs changing their mission and strategies—for instance, by embracing
collective bargaining—and NGO employees questioning themselves about their
individual drives, commitment, and aspirations.
Under Xi Jinping, Chinese authorities no longer appreciate the beneﬁts that
labor NGOs may bring to social order and stability, and they are determined
to weaken their operations. They know that the most effective way to do that
is through the enactment of laws. In accordance with Xi’s “governing the nation
in accordance to the law” platform, criminal legislation is being employed to in-
criminate individual labor activists, while the legislation governing NGOs is be-
ing used to curtail potential sources of international funding. Even though some
foreign funding still manages to reach the NGOs and to support their activities,
the new laws make it extremely difﬁcult to transfer money to the organizations in
a straightforward way, especially considering that most of the labor NGOs do not
have any ofﬁcial registration in mainland China.
As noted in this article, the labor NGOs have responded to the more sophis-
ticated strategies of repression by the Party-state not by strengthening their ex-
isting networks and alliances but by becoming increasingly isolated and atom-
ized. While in the very short term this shift toward atomization makes sense
to labor NGOs as a strategy of survival, in the long term these developments
threaten the very existence of these organizations in China. Under increasing as-
sault, the isolated, atomized, and impoverished NGOs that survive Xi’s repres-
sion “according to the law” will have no other choice than to adjust. They can
either do so by changing the scope of their mission—for instance, by subordinat-
ing themselves to the authorities and focusing on less sensitive activities such as
those related to corporate social responsibility—or by abandoning any sem-
blance of formal organization and going underground to operate as individual
activists. If they fail to do so, they might have to rely on the “generosity” of
the Party-state more than ever before in the hope of being granted some space
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